I was reading Justice Scalia’s Timbers case re: adequate protection and relief from stay. In the opinion, Justice Scalia strongly disagreed with the Bank’s continual misinterpretation of 362(d)(2). He writes…..
“[The Bank] offers no reason why Congress would want to provide relief for such an obstreperous and thoroughly unharmed creditor.”
Obstreperous means noisy and difficult to control.
With one word, he calls the Bank a tantrum-throwing four year old. I’ll be sure to use this word in my future oppositions.
Reading an unpublished BAP opinion, the panel reminds me not only of my duty of loyalty, but that this duty continues even after I am done representing my client because an attorney may not do anything which will injuriously affect a former client. Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal. 4th 811, 821 (2011).
The best part was reading California Supreme Court’s recitation of the duty of loyalty over 80 years ago:
One of the principal obligations which binds an attorney is that of fidelity, the maintaining inviolate the confidence reposed in him by those who employ him, and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets of his client. This obligation is a very high and stringent one. It is also an attorney’s duty to protect his client in every possible way, and it is a violation of that duty to assume a position adverse or antagonistic to his client without the latter’s free and intelligent consent given after full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances. By virtue of this rule an attorney is precluded from assuming any relation which would prevent him from devoting his entire energies to his client’s interests. Nor does it matter that the intention and motives of the attorney are honest. The rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a position where he may be required to choose between conflicting duties, or be led to attempt to reconcile conflicting interests, rather than to enforce to their full extent the rights of the interest which he should alone represent.
Anderson v. Eaton, 211 Cal. 113, 116 (1930).
On August 20, 2015, the Los Angeles Division District Court was presented with the issue of whether false advertising on the internet was subject to anti-SLAPP protection. The case is In L.A. Taxi Cooperative, Inc. v. The Independent Taxi Owners Association of Los Angeles and a copy can be found here.
Apparently rival cab companies are purchasing pay per click advertisements on leading search engines which purport to be the rival company but really redirect customers to their own websites and numbers. An example is:
Kia Tehrany, director of operations for Yellow Cab, stated that he conducted a search using the terms “‘Yellow Cab Los Angeles.’” The results included the following:
Yellow Cab Los Angeles – Call 800-521-8294 or Book Online!
Our Cabs get you there Fast & Safe.
Tehrany stated that neither the listed telephone number nor the website was owned or controlled by Yellow Cab. Instead, the website contained information related solely to taxi services provided by ITOA.
If an order confirming a Plan of Reorganization is procured by fraud, how many days from entry of order does one have to ask the court to revoke the order?
The answer depends on which chapter of the Bankruptcy Code we’re talking about! In a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 case, one would have up to the 180th day after the date the order was entered to seek revocation of the discharge. In a Chapter 11 case, one would have up to the 179th day after the date the order was entered to seek revocation. That is a pretty tough lesson to learn the hard way.
The following is borrowed from Judge Carroll’s recent August 27, 2015 unpublished opinion on a claims objection which can be found here.
In law school, we learned that if a written instrument is valid, complete and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to vary, add to, or contradict the terms of the instrument. This is called the parol evidence rule. The exception to this rule is if there is an allegation of fraud, accident or mistake.
We all know the general statute of limitations for suing attorneys is within after one year of discovering the facts constituting the wrongful act or within one year of when the client should have discovered the facts constituting the wrongful act through the use of reasonable diligence but never more than four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission. See Code Civ. Proc. § 437c.
The limitations period is tolled if, among other reasons, the plaintiff has not sustained an actual injury or if the attorney continues to represent the plaintiff regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred. See Code Civ. Proc. § 340.6.
In the scenario discussed today, the attorney forgets the deadline to file an objection to a bogus lien. Because of the missed deadline, the client hires a different firm and ultimately agrees to accept $1.6 million less than it would otherwise have received.
The problem is even though the client knew his former attorney missed the deadline to object to the bogus lien, he waited over a year, until after the $1.6 million hit, to file a malpractice action. So is the malpractice action timely since the client had not sustained an actual injury?
I have spoken with quite a few practitioners and surprisingly, all of them have said the same thing: an individual Debtor in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy can only receive a discharge once every 8 years.
Then a good friend of mine and told me about his magic bullet: he would vacate the prior discharge to make his clients eligible for the Chapter 11 discharge. It is quite brilliant actually but it turns out not to be necessary.
First, let’s discuss the code section which seems to have caused all the confusion:
Last Saturday I attended the CDCBAA CLE on “Handling Tax Debt Dischargeability and Bankruptcy Tax Disputes.”
The speakers were Judge Kwan, Arnold H. Wuhrman, Esq. of Serenity Legal Services, P.C., and assistant U.S. Attorneys Robert F. Conte, Esq. and Najah Shariff. Judge Saltzman and Judge Houle’s former law clerk, Jolene Tanner also made a special guest appearance. Najah and Jolene are the two new faces of the IRS. They will have the primary responsibility for all bankruptcy related litigation in the entire Central District of California.
(from far left to right: Jolene Tanner, Robert Conte, Najah Shariff, Judge Kwan, and Arnold H. Wuhrman)
If a Court were to also make a finding of fact in its Order sustaining a claim objection “...creditor has also manipulated the books and records,” can the creditor ask the Court to amend its order out of fear that such language in an Order would have a potential preclusive effect in another court?
As the Supreme Court has twice ruled within the last six years, “the first court does not get to dictate the preclusive consequences of its own judgment.” Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1361 (2008).
As Judge Jaraslovsky told a party seeking to have the court’s order amended for fear of its preclusive effect, “I’ve rendered my decision. I gave my reasons. And if another court decides that they want to give preclusive effect, that’s for another court to decide.”
If a bank obtains a Note, but the Note contains an endorsement in blank on its face — can the bank seek to enforce the the lien associated with the Note against a residence?